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I.S.B. #5867 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
P.O. Box 2816 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43372 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2909 
v.     ) 
     ) 
SCOTT ALLEN SANDERS, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Scott Allen Sanders pled guilty to attempted 
strangulation.  He received a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but the 
district court retained jurisdiction.  Following his rider, the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Sanders contends that the district court abused its 
discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, and in failing to reduce this sentence or place 
him on probation in light of the additional information submitted in conjunction with his 




Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In the evening on August 22, 2013, Scott Sanders and his wife, Tabitha Sanders, 
got into a verbal altercation.  (2014 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 2014 
PSI), p.3.)  During the altercation, Mr. Sanders allegedly punched his wife in the face 
and put his arm around her neck which made it difficult for her to breathe.  (2014 PSI, 
p.3.)  When law enforcement arrived at the house, Mr. Sanders walked over to one 
officer and told the officer to take him to jail and that he assaulted his wife.  (2014 PSI, 
p.24.)  Mr. Sanders then told the officer he wanted to kill himself.  (2014 PSI, p.24.)  He 
was taken to Intermountain Hospital on a mental hold.  (2014 PSI, p.25.)  Based on 
these facts, Mr. Sanders was charged by information with one count of attempted 
strangulation and one count of misdemeanor domestic battery.  (R., pp.30-31.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Sanders pled guilty to the attempted 
strangulation.  (5/19/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.24-25; R., pp.101-108.)  As part of the plea 
agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor charge and to recommend a 
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction.  
(5/19/14 Tr., p.3, L.19 – p.4, L.25; R., p.99.)  The district court accepted the plea and 
ordered a Presentence Investigation and a domestic violence evaluation.   (5/19/14 
Tr., p.12, Ls.1-6, p.13, Ls.12-24; R., pp.100, 110.)   
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of ten years, with two years 
fixed, but that the district court retain jurisdiction.  (7/7/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-14.)  
Mr. Sanders’ counsel asked the district court to consider placing Mr. Sanders on 
probation.  (7/7/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.16-17.) The district court sentenced Mr. Sanders to a 
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unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for up to 365 
days.  (7/7/14 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15; R., pp.124-127.)   
After a hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered 
Mr. Sanders to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.  (R., pp.133-135.)  
Mr. Sanders filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.139-142.)   
Mr. Sanders then filed a timely Rule 35 Motion seeking a reduction of his 
sentence.  (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.)   Mr. Sanders’ counsel asked the district court 
to reduce Mr. Sanders’ sentence.  (Motion to Augment, p.1.)  The district court denied 
Mr. Sanders’ Rule 35 motion without a hearing.  (Motion to Augment, pp.12-18.)  
Mr. Sanders appeals from the order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court’s 
order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.     
 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Sanders to ten years, 
with two years fixed, upon his conviction for one count of attempted 
strangulation?  
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Sanders? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Sanders’ Idaho 








The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Sanders To Ten Years, 
With Two Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To Attempted Strangulation 
 
Mr. Sanders asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentence of ten years, 
with two years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing 
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an 
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Sanders does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.   Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Sanders must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.  
Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. Sanders’ case, all of which indicate 
that a more lenient sentence would be appropriate.  Factors such as Mr. Sanders’ 
mental health conditions and the fact that Mr. Sanders was remorseful and accepted 
responsibility for his wrongful acts should have resulted in a lesser sentence.   
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The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires 
the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor.  Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  Mr. Sanders suffers from depression and anxiety.  
(2014 PSI, pp.10-11.)  Mr. Sanders has a history of suicide attempts; prior to this 
incident the most recent attempt occurred in 2013.1  (2014 PSI, p.10.)  Mr. Sanders also 
suffers from anxiety attacks.  (2014 PSI, p.11.)  Furthermore, Mr. Sanders has Type I 
diabetes and the condition, combined with his depression, left him disabled and unable 
to work.  (2014 PSI, pp.9-10; GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary, p.1.)     
In addition to his mental health issues, Mr. Sanders struggles with substance 
abuse.  (2014 PSI, pp.11-12.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance 
abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court 
imposes sentence.  State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial 
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it 
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for 
treating the problem.”  Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that 
ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of 
conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 
(1981).  Mr. Sanders has been using alcohol since he was eighteen years old.  (2014 
PSI, p.11; GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary, p.2.)  Mr. Sanders had 
                                            
1 While at Intermountain Hospital immediately following the incident, Mr. Sanders’ blood 
sugar level was dangerously low—apparently he had tried to overdose on insulin prior 
to the arrival of law enforcement at his home.  (2014 PSI, pp.24-25.)  Mr. Sanders was 
attempting to put himself in a diabetic coma and die.  (2014 PSI, p.25.) 
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been drinking the day of the incident and acknowledged that alcohol was one factor that 
contributed to his criminal behavior; however, he realizes that he needs to stop drinking 
to avoid future legal problems.  (2014 PSI, p.13; Domestic Violence Evaluation, p.5.)  
Mr. Sanders wants to stop using alcohol and is willing to engage in a treatment 
program.  (2014 PSI, p.12.)  Mr. Sanders wants to get the help he needs.  (2014 PSI, 
p.12.)  Following the incident, Mr. Sanders began counseling at Desert Sage Health 
Center.  (R., pp.8, 11.) 
Further, Mr. Sanders served in the military many years ago.  (2014 PSI, p.9.)  In 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982), the court found the defendant’s honorable 
discharge from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence.  Mr. Sanders was 
honorably discharged after serving in the Army National Guard.  (2014 PSI, p.9.) 
Another aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the 
fact that Mr. Sanders has strong support from family members and friends.  See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).  Mr. Sanders’ family is 
very important to him.  (2014 PSI, pp.6, 12.)  Mr. Sanders’ mother and father are very 
supportive of their son, and Mr. Sanders helps care for his parents, who both have 
health issues.  (2014 PSI, p.6.)  Mr. Sanders also has a supportive girlfriend with whom 
he will live when he is released into the community.  (2014 PSI, p.7.)       
Further, Mr. Sanders expressed remorse for his conduct and took responsibility 
for his acts.  (5/19/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.24-25; 2014 PSI, p.4; Domestic Violence Evaluation, 
p.6.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
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remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts.  State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).   
Mr. Sanders verbalized accountability for his actions at his pre-sentencing 
interview.  (2014 PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Sanders wrote that he “[w]ish[ed] I’d never done it.”  
(2014 PSI, p.4.)  See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence 
of first time offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his 
family in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 
(Ct. App. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) (reducing sentence 
of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had been of 
good character before the offense at issue); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 
(Ct. App. 1991) (noting that some leniency is required when the defendant has 
expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to 
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character”).   
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Sanders asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his mental health conditions, alcohol 
addiction, and acceptance of responsibility, it would have imposed a less severe 
sentence.  
 
                                                           II. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Sanders 
 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. 
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Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).  “The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion.”   State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 
2010).  Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court 
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original 
judgment.  Id. at 289. 
Mr. Sanders contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his successes during his period of retained jurisdiction, his desire 
to make the changes necessary so that this type of incident does not happen again, and 
the mitigating factors present in Mr. Sanders’ case. 
Mr. Sanders was participating in his programming and had expressed a 
willingness to change his criminal thinking and behavior.  (APSI, p.4.)  Although, while 
on his rider, Mr. Sanders did receive one informal disciplinary sanction,2 he also 
engaged in commendable behavior, including holding the position of coordinator for the 
expeditor crew, a role given to those considered truthful and trustworthy.  (APSI, pp.3-
4.)  Although he was eventually removed from the position, “[o]verall, Mr. Sanders did a 
good job with the coordinator position.”  (APSI, p.8.)  Further, Mr. Sanders was viewed 
by his peers as a strong leader with a lot to offer, and he was very articulate about his 
feelings and thoughts.  (APSI, p.8.)  While on the rider, he learned how to build healthy 
peer relationships, academic skills, and good work habits.  (APSI, p.4.)  Mr. Sanders 
                                            
2 Mr. Sanders was given a verbal warning after he was disrespectful to medical staff 
when he was notified that the doctor was not going to change anything with his insulin.  
(APSI, p.3.) 
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demonstrated a willingness to hold accountability of his peers and acceptance when 
held accountable for his own behavior.  (APSI, p.4.)  Mr. Sanders identified healthy, new 
thinking and showed readiness to use the new thinking to become a positive member in 
society and contribute to the community.  (APSI, p.5.)  Notably, Mr. Sanders’ case 
manager recommended probation.  (APSI, pp.1, 11.) 
Mr. Sanders told the district court at his rider review hearing: 
Yes, I did have some struggles throughout the program and I can’t deny 
that.  And I did learn a lot from this program.  It helped me realize that 
there’s a lot more from the original – the original PSI.  There’s a lot more 
underlying issues that I failed to recognize and address at the time.  This 
program has given me the opportunity to look into that and also hopefully 
today if I’m put on probation it will give me a chance to further look into 
these and hopefully develop a good strong, healthy relationship with my 
family and to encourage my recovery from my alcoholism and simply just 
look into my behaviors and make sure that I do my best to not repeat 
these behaviors.  
 
(6/5/15Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.8.) 
 
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Sanders’ accomplishments while on 
the retained jurisdiction would equate to a successful probation when it relinquished its 
jurisdiction over Mr. Sanders.   
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Sanders’ significant rehabilitative potential, the district court 
abused its discretion when relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Sanders. 
 
     III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Sanders’ Rule 35 Motion In 
Light Of The New Information Provided In Support Thereof 
 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
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be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction.  Id.  “When presenting a Rule 35 
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.”  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
The new information presented in support of Mr. Sanders’ Rule 35 motion 
showed that, since being sentenced, he had been in the custody of the Idaho 
Department of Correction for 561 days which had a substantial rehabilitative effect on 
Mr. Sanders, he had realized the burden his incarceration was placing on his family 
members, because the prison was overcrowded and Mr. Sanders is willing to abide by 
the conditions of probation thus his release would be a much greater use of penal 
resources, and that he is a military veteran deserving some leniency.  (Motion to 
Augment, pp.1-3.)   
In addition to the new information provided in support of his Rule 35 motion, the 
district court was aware of the mitigating circumstances present at the time of his 
sentencing hearing, all of which were discussed in greater detail in Section I.  Based on 
the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at the time 
of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce 




Mr. Sanders respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it sees 
fit or place him on probation.  Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 
35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.  
 DATED this 21st day of March, 2016. 
 
      ____________/s/_____________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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